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THE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF PLEADINGS
UNDER THE CODES AND UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Roscoe Pound once stated that pleadings have four purposes: 1) to
serve as a formal basis for the judgment; 2) to separate issues of fact from
questions of law; 3) to give litigants the advantage of a plea of res judicata
if molested again for the same cause; and 4) to notify the parties of the
claims, defenses and cross-demands of their adversaries.' During the past
century pleadings which contain an admission against the pleaders' interest
have assumed a collateral function, namely as evidence in the same trial or
in subsequent proceedings.
Formerly, pleadings were so involved and technical that they could
not be said to be. the statements of the parties in whose behalf they were
drawn or filed.2 The main purpose of a pleading at common law was to
frame an issue, often in terms of one of the numerous fictional common-
law counts.3 Against this background, averments of a complaint or an-
swer could be considered little more than the suggestions of counsel.
However, with the advent of fact pleading, characteristic of procedure under
the codes,4 and the development of notice pleading under the Federal
1. 35 A.B.A. REP. 614, 638 (1910).
2. Before 1400 all pleadings were oral. STEPHEN ON PLEADING 59 (Tyler
1924). It wasn't until the early 1400's that the practice developed of entering pleadings
directly on the record out of the presence of the court. 3 HOLDSWORTH, A HisTORY ov
ENGLISH LAW 644 (3d ed. 1923). In the late 1400's a note or memorandum of a plead-
ing could be left with the prothonotary or clerk who would prepare a draft of a proper
entry. Ibid. The transition between oral and written pleadings was completed in the
17th century when written drafts of pleading entries took the place of oral pleadings.
3 id. at 648. Although under oral practice a pleader was expected to speak the truth,
there was no clear distinction between allegation and proof. 2 id. at 105. However,
with the change-over to written pleadings came a distinction-statements of fact in
a pleading were mere allegations and without more the court had no basis for believing
them to be true. Blume, Theory of Pleading-A Survey Iicludihg the Federal Rules,
47 MicH. L. Rzv. 297, 300 (1949).
3. CLAR, CODE PLEADING 29 (1928).
4. Code pleading is "any system of pleading which has been reduced to the form
of a statute." HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPdENT OF CODE PLEADING 11 (1897). "Charac-
teristically code pleading is that form of a statutory pleading which: 1. has risen out
of the English common-law procedure; 2. provides for the following: a. a single
judicial instrument-a single form of action-for the protection of all primary rights
whether legal or equitable. b. a limited pleading characterized by plain and concise
statements of the substantive facts, and none but the substantive facts, of
the cause of action. c. the bringing in of new parties and the joinder of different
causes of action between the necessary parties, with a view to the complete determina-
tion of the whole controversy. d. the adjustment of the relief according to the sub-
stantial rights pleaded and proven, of all the parties before the court, and of each of
them, be they few or many." Id. at 12-13.
ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS AS EVIDENCE
Rules of Civil Procedure,5 fictional pleading has 'largely been abolished
and statements contained in a pleading have assumed evidentiary value.
The present tendency of courts is to admit pleadings of the same or a
prior proceeding into evidence when they contain admissions against the
interest of the pleader. Naturally, the pleading offered must be relevant
and material and there must be compliance with other customary rules
of evidence.6 It is the purpose of this Note to investigate the problems
peculiar to the use of pleadings as evidence under the codes and the federal
rules.
II. PLEADINGS AS EVIDENCE IN THE CODE STATES
A. The Present Status of the Law
With the exception of four states which have retained common-law
pleading, 7 and a number of states which have eliminated the pleading of
"facts," 8 the majority of jurisdictions today operate under a form of
code pleading similar in basic respects to the New York Field Code of
1848. 0 In keeping with code requirements of fact pleading, a preliminary
distinction is made in these jurisdictions between admissions of fact and
conclusions of law, only the former being admissible. The pleader's con-
clusions of law are not considered admissions of the facts necessary to
support them and, accordingly, will not be received in evidence under the
admissions exception to prove the truth of the facts stated.10  However,
5. Congress provided that the Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe
rules for United States district courts and for the courts of the District of Columbia.
28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1952).
6. Hines v. Bost, 224 S.W. 698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
7. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 112, § 1 (1954); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 391, § 3
(1942) ; 1I. GSN. LAws c. 509, § 1 (1938) ; TzNN. CoD ANN. § 20-801 (1956).
8. See Amz. Rtv. STAT. ANN. Vol. 16, p. 11 (1956) ; COLO. R. Civ. P. 8a (1941);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1 (1953); N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:8-1 (1953) ; UTAH R. Civ. P.
8 (1953).
9. In 1948 the Field Code was adopted in New York in an attempt to reform
the difficulties inherent in the common-law system of procedure. See N.Y. Sess. Laws
1848, c. 380, § 1. The following statutes are similar to the New York statute in that
they require the pleading of "facts": ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 212 (1940); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 27-1113 (1947) ; CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 426 (West 1954); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 7813 (1949); DEI.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3901 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. 51-
02 (1956) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 81-101 (1935) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-605 (1948) ; ILL.
ANN. STAT. c. 110, § 33 (Smith-Hurd 1956) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1004 (Burns 1933) ;
IOWA R. CIv. P. 70 (1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-704 (1949); Ky. Cmii..
CODE PRAc. ANN. § 90 (Carroll 1948); LA. REy. STAT. ANN. § 13.3601 (1951); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 75, § 2 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 231, § 7 (1956); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27.812 (1938) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544. 02 (1947) ; Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 1464 (1942) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 509. 050 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-3202
(1947); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-804 (1943); NE. ComP. LAWS § 8594 (1929); N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. Acr § 241; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-122 (1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 28-0702
(1943); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2309. 04 (Page 1954); OYLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 264 (1937) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 16. 210 (1953) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, rule 1019
(1951); S.C. CODE § 10-632 (1952); S.D. CODE § 33.0903 (1939) ; TEx. R. Civ.
PRoc. 47 (1955); VT. RE. STAT. § 1613 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-102 (1950);
WASH. RE. CODE § 432.040 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5609 (1955) ; Wis. STAT.
§ 263.03 (1953); Wyo. Co p. STAT. ANN. § 3-1301 (1945).
10. E.g., Srednick v. Sylak, 343 Pa. 486, 492, 23 A.2d 333, 337 (1941). Conclu-
sions of law may, however, be admitted in evidence under the opinion exception to the
hearsay rule. MCCORMICK, EVIDS Nc § 241 (1954).
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there is nothing to prevent the introduction of such evidence for the pur-
pose of impeaching the credibility of the declarant. It is not a prerequisite
of admissibility in code jurisdictions that the pleading offered in evidence
was filed in the same jurisdiction. Pleadings filed in a federal court, for
example, have been permitted in evidence in subsequent state proceedings. 1'
In determining the evidentiary value of a pleading filed in another juris-
diction, the court of the jurisdiction in which it is offered must look to the
procedural rules governing pleadings in that other jurisdiction at the
time the pleading was drawn.
The general test for admissibility of pleadings under the codes seems
to be whether, under the circumstances, the party against whom the ad-
missions are offered can fairly be supposed to have had personal knowledge
of the content of the pleadings.12 There is, however, some conflict as to
what factors must be present to establish such knowledge. Some juris-
dictions admit pleadings into evidence only when they have been signed
by the litigant or when there is other positive evidence indicating knowl-
edge on his part.'3 This places the burden of presenting evidence of the
pleader's knowledge upon the party offering the admission. Other states,
where the pleading is signed only by the party's attorney, recognize a
rebuttable presumption of knowledge. 14  If the pleading offered was filed
in a prior proceeding in which the parties joined issue on the fact admitted
in the pleading, some jurisdictions hold this to be sufficient indication of
knowledge. 15
In no jurisdiction are admissions in pleadings conclusive. The party
against whom the pleading is offered may in each case explain to the jury
the circumstances under which the admission was made; "I evidence may
11. E.g., Allen v. Hazen, 26 Mich. 142, 144 (1872).
12. 1 GisRv=L , EvimNcs § 186 (16th ed. 1899). The cases, with few excep-
tions, e.g., Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 379, 380-81, 17 S.E. 92, 94-95 (1892), neglect to
speak of the admission into evidence of pleadings on a theory of representative or
vicarious admissions; see McCoRmIcK, EviDxNCs 520 (1954); UNroRm RumS op
EvmNcs rule 63(9). It would appear that in the context of the law of Agency, the
statements made by an attorney are made within the scope of his authority and should
therefore be binding upon his client. However, this Note will attempt to analyse the
evidentiary considerations which are necessary when pleadings are offered in evidence
rather than discussing the problem from the standpoint of the law of Agency.
13. Birmingham Elec. Co. v. Wood, 222 Ala. 103, 105, 130 So. 786, 787 (1930);
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Zolliecoffer, 209 Ark. 559, 563-64, 191 S.W2d 587, 589 (1946) ;
Griffin Grocery Co. v. Thaxton 178 Ark. 736, 740-41, 11 S.W.2d 473, 474 (1928);
Jackson v. Schine Lexington Corp., 305 Ky. 823, 825, 205 S.W.2d 1013, 1014-15
(1947) ; Clarke v. Taylor, 269 Mass. 335, 336, 168 N.E. 806, 807 (1929) ; Cady v. Dox-
tator, 193 Mich. 170, 159,N.W. 151 (1916).
14. E.g., 'Greer v. Davis, 177 Ark. 55, 58, 5 S.W.2d 742, 743 (1928); Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 136 Me. 406, 419-20, 11 A.2d 898, 905 (1940); Peck v. New England
Tel. & Tel. Co., 225 Mass. 464, 466, 114 N.E. 675 (1917); Carpenter v. Tri-state
Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 Minn. 287, 288-89, 211 N.W. 463, 464 (1926) ; Leistikow v. Zuels-
dorf, 18 N.D. 511, 515-16, 122 N.W. 340, 342 (1909) ; Quealy Land & Livestock Co.
v. George, 45 Wyo. 254, 262, 18 P.2d 253, 255-56 (1933).
15. E.g., Cady v. Doxtator, 193 Mich. 170, 159 N.W. 151 (1916) ; Reno v. Bull,
226 N.Y. 546, 554-55, 124 N.E. 144,146 (1919); Pipan v. Aetna Ins. Co., 60 N.D.
657, 663-64, 235 N.W. 719, 721 (1931).
16. E.g., Hope v. First Nat. Bank, 198 La. 878, 891, 5 So. 2d 138, 142 (1941);
Stinchcomb v. Mortgage Co., 171 Md. 317, 324, 188 Atl. 790, 792 (1936) ; Cherry v.
Mitosky, 353 Pa. 401, 406, 45 A.2d 23, 26 (1946).
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be introduced to show, for example, that a pleading was signed at a time
when the pleader was mistaken as to the true facts.' 7 Since the greater
number of jurisdictions require pleadings containing admissions to be
offered in evidence before being made use of as tending to prove the facts
admitted,'8 the pleader may offer his explanation of the admission before it
reaches the jury. It is important at this point to distinguish between the
above use of pleadings, with their ordinary use in the same cause as
judicial admissions. In the latter sense they are not evidence but rather
a waiver of all controversy and therefore a limitation of the issues. 19
There is little or no controversy concerning the persons, in addition
to the pleader, against whom an admission in a pleading may be used.
Admissions of fact in the answer of one defendant generally may not be
used against his co-defendant, since the latter was not the individual who
made the admission.20 However, this rule does not apply where the
parties have a joint interest, either as partners or otherwise, in the trans-
action in question.2 '
There is disagreement among the states as to what constitutes suffi-
cient evidence of the party's knowledge of the contents of a pleading
in the area of abandoned or withdrawn pleadings. A majority do not
distinguish between a pleading that has been abandoned or withdrawn
prior to the time when it is offered in evidence, and a pleading that has
been permitted to stand.22 In these jurisdictions, if the pleading would
have been admissible in its original state under the standards imposed upon
pleadings generally, then it is admissible although its basic role as a plead-
ing has ceased m The rationale behind this position appears to be that
an admission made at any time has evidentiary value; 2 4 the fact that it
was retracted is a question of weight to be left to the trier of fact.2 5 There
are, however, states, which hold that once a pleading is abandoned or
withdrawn, its function for any purpose is terminated2 This position
17. See Dixon v. Davidson, 202 Wis. 19, 22, 231 N.W. 276, 278 (1930).
18. E.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 573, 68 S.W. 433 435 (1902);
Greenville v. Steamship Co., 104 N.C. 91, 93, 10 S.E. 147, 148 (1888). 6 ontra, Bowes
v. Cannon, 50 Colo. 262, 268, 116 Pac. 336, 338-39 (1911); Koser v. Hornback, 75
Idaho 24, 33, 265 P.2d 988, 993 (1954).
19. See 4 WIGmoRS, EvDXNcM § 1064 (3d ed. 1940).
20. E.g., Chambliss v. Smith, 30 Ala. 366, 368 (1857); Eckman v. Eckman, 55
Pa. 269, 276 (1867).
21. McCoRmicK, EvRSNcZ 520 (1954).
22. E.g., Stout v. McNary, 75 Idaho 99, 103, 267 P2d 625, 628 (1954) ; Law-
rence v. Tschirgi 244 Iowa 386, 390, 57 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1953); Carlson v. Fredsall,
228 Minn. 461, 472-73, 37 N.W2d 744, 749-50 (1949); Johnson v. Griepenstroh, 150
Neb. 126, 130, 33 N.W2d 549, 552 (1948) ; Taliaferro v. Reirdon, 197 Okla. 55, 168
P.2d 292 (1946).
23. See text at note 13 and note 15 supra.
24. See Norris v. Rawlings, 138 Ga. 711, 76 S.E. 60 (1912), where an amendment
was disallowed as a pleading but was permitted in evidence as an admission.
25. E.g., Bartlow v. C.B. & Q. R.R., 243 Ill. 332, 337, 90 N.E. 721, 723 (1909);
Carlson v. Fredsall, 228 Minn. 461, 472-73, 37 .N.W.2d 744, 749-50 (1949); Johnson
v. Sheridan Lumber Co., 51 Ore. 35, 44, 93 Pac. 470, 473 (1908).
26. E.g., Little Rock & Ft. S. Ry. v. Clark, 58 Ark. 490, 493, 25 S.W. 504, 505
(1894); Wiley v. Northern Pac. Ry., 60 Wash. 597, 111 Pac. 801 (1910).
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assumes that the act of revocation is an indication that the pleader found
himself to be mistaken about the statements of fact which the original
pleading contained, and that, therefore, the evidentiary value of the ad-
mission is low compared with the potential prejudice involved.
27
B. Considerations Affecting the Admissibility of Pleadings
The majority of cases rely on the adversary theory of litigation as
reason for admitting pleadings into evidence 28 If an individual has at any
time made a statement which his opponent can now utilize to the detriment
of the declarant, the courts admit the statement in evidence and put the task
of explanation upon the declarant.
If, however, the basic reason for introducing evidence in a judicial
proceeding is to enable the trier of fact to determine what the "facts" are,
the adversary theory provides an inadequate foundation for accepting
pleadings in evidence. Rather, consideration should be given to the re-
liability of pleadings as evidence, particularly in view of the impact state-
ments in pleadings may have upon a jury when commented on by skillful
counsel.
Pleadings are a species of hearsay evidence. 29  Traditionally, their
entry into evidence has been treated by the authorities as an application of
the admissions exception to the hearsay rule.30 Hearsay exceptions gen-
erally are founded upon the existence of special circumstances which assure
the probable reliability of the types of evidence involved. Reliability is
primarily the product of two factors: (1) veracity, and (2) objective ac-
curacy. There are situations in which the veracity element is strong
enough to warrant the admission of evidence even though there is no
proof that the witness was accurate in his observations. Dying declara-
tions,3 1 declarations against interest 3 2 and admissions 3 are within this
category. A statement made in the face of death is admitted because of
the belief that a declarant under such circumstances would not be prone
to lie. Whether or not that person was in a position to adequately per-
ceive what took place does not affect the admissibility of the statement
made. Similar reasoning calls for the admission of a statement which
at the time it was made was against the interest of the declarant. It is
more likely than not that a person making a remark which is against his
interest is revealing the facts as he truthfully believes they exist and is more
likely to be accurate.
27. INd.
28. See LAD, EviDXNct 437 (2d ed. 1955).
29. The hearsay rule challenges statements "not made on the stand" and "not
made at a time and place where it could be subjected to certain essential tests or in-
vestigations calculated to demonstrate its real value by exposing latent sources of
error." 5 WIGMOmR, Evmr*NC 3 (3d ed. 1940).
30. E.g., McCoRMIcK, EvImNc § 242 (1954).
31. UNIFORm RuLs op EviDNc rule 63 (5).
32. Id. rule 63(10).
33. Id. rule 63(7).
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Although a statement made in a pleading may in a later context turn
out to have been an "admission," it must be considered to have been a
self-serving declaration at the time when it was drawn. Plaintiffs and de-
fendants 34 will each draft pleadings designed to prevent summary disposi-
tion of their respective cases by a demurrer or its equivalent. Accordingly,
the veracity basis for reliability presumed to be present in the case of
admissions and declarations against interest may not be present in the
same measure in the case of pleadings.
Moreover, it is often the case that the pleader has not had a primary
sensory perception of many of the facts which he alleges. His pleading
may be largely dependent upon statements made to him by others (who
may or may not become witnesses in the action). Therefore, it is often
not possible to rely on the objective accuracy of the pleadings.
1. Pleadings Signed by the Party
Pleadings signed by a party under oath or accompanied by an affi-
davit offer the strongest evidence of veracity and therefore of reliability.3 5
The oath or affirmation is some indication that the party had knowledge of
the contents of the pleading and that the statements contained in the plead-
ing were made with some degree of solemnity. Since the factor of veracity
is present, the pleading should be accepted in evidence unless the pleader
against whom it is offered can carry the burden of challenging its re-
liability to the satisfaction of the court in one of two ways: either by offer-
ing evidence that he in fact had no knowledge of the contents of the
pleadings or evidence that at the time the pleadings were drawn he was
laboring under a mistake of fact. If the pleader attempts the first course,
that of showing no knowledge of the contents of the pleadings, the demands
of the adversary theory and the sanctity of pleadings may indicate that
appropriate disciplinary action should be taken against either the party or
his attorney, depending upon the source of the fault.3 6 But the pleading
should nevertheless not be admitted if the court is satisfied that the party
actually had no knowledge of its contents.
2. Pleadings Signed Only by the Attorney
The veracity of a pleading is not as strongly established when it is
signed by the attorney alone. The attorney's signature is neither an
34. According to Professor Morgan statements may be admitted under the hearsay
rule even -though they were not against the interest of the declarant at the time they
were made; see Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE
L.J. 355 (1921). It is submitted, however, that a distinction should be drawn between
ordinary statements made at a time when no litigation is contemplated and those made
in a pleading when the preliminary steps involved in litigation have been taken.
35. There are some jurisdictions which compel the party litigant to sign an affidavit
verifying the contents of the pleading. See PHmA. C.P. CT. (Civ.) RULss 1023, 1024.
36. Perhaps a more frequent use of contempt proceedings against those who de-
liberately insert false information into the contents of the pleading will be an effective
sanction against such practices. Although this weapon is at the disposal of the courts
it is very seldom invoked.
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indication that the client, against whom the statements will be offered, has
read and therefore has knowledge of the contents of the pleading, nor that
the client regarded the making of the statements in the pleading as a solemn
act. Moreover, in drawing a pleading, an attorney may depend to some
extent on his memory of statements made to him by the client or witnesses
at an earlier date. Errors or distortions may thus creep in. It might be
argued that the attorney's signature is some indication of veracity on the
attorney's part and that the client, having entrusted his case to the attorney,
ought to be responsible for what the attorney says.37 Such an argument,
however, is not founded upon considerations of reliability but upon the
theory' of vicarious admissions.
The reliability of pleadings signed only by the attorney may further
be called in question by the code jurisdiction rule that evidence not in
conformance with the pleadings may not be introduced at the trial.3 Faced
with such a rule, an attorney may attempt to protect his client in the im-
pending trial and incidentally his own interest in winning the case, by
pleading as much as possible without primary regard for the veracity of
the statements made. This threat to the veracity of statements in plead-
ings is also present in situations where the client signs the pleading, since
the attorney may be expected to impress upon the client the need to lay
a foundation for the introduction of evidence. However, some safeguard
is found because the client, if required to sign the pleading under oath, may
cause statements known by him to be untrue to be stricken.
In light of these considerations it is believed that a pleading signed
only by an attorney cannot be admitted in evidence as reliable on the basis
of the veracity element alone. Before such a pleading should be admitted,
it should therefore be incumbent upon the party offering it to carry the
burden of satisfying the court that reliability can be founded upon the
pleader's objective accuracy. To do this he would have to demonstrate
successfully that the pleader had knowledge of the contents of the pleading
and had a primary sensory perception of the facts alleged.
3. Other Factors Affecting Reliability
In addition to the basic distinction between pleadings signed only by
an attorney and those signed by the party, other factors which have a
bearing upon reliability should be considered. Pleadings which have been
withdrawn or later amended, for example, should be distinguished from
those permitted to stand. The fact that a pleading is withdrawn or amended
may be some indication that the party was dissatisfied with its contents,
which in turn casts doubt on the veracity of the statements made. The
party attempting to introduce the pleading in evidence ought therefore to be
required to persuade the court that the pleading was withdrawn or amended
for reasons other than a change in belief on the part of the pleader, for
37. See Lamar v. Pearre, 90 Ga. 377, 380-81, 17 S.E. 92, 94-95 (1892).
38. ODGIRs, PRINCIPIS oP" PIADING AND) PRAcTici 230 (13th ed. 1946).
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example, for tactical purposes. This burden should rest upon the pleader's
opponent even in cases where the pleading was signed by the client rather
than his attorney. Note should also be taken of possible differences between
pleadings drawn for a prior proceeding and those which are a part of the
proceeding in which they are offered. As was previously discussed, evidence
must conform with the pleadings in most code jurisdictions 39 and, accord-
ingly, there is a temptation on the part of attorneys to include statements
in pleadings without regard to their truthfulness. The fact that a state-
ment made may become an "admission" in the context of later litigation
is probably not a deterrent to this practice. However, it is reasonable to
assume that the attorney will use care not to include statements which will
be damaging to his client in the context of the present litigation. Those
that are included may be analogized to other admissions and declarations
against interest, the veracity factor of which is high. It is therefore believed
that a pleading drawn for the proceeding in which it is offered in evidence
should be admitted unless the pleader can convincingly demonstrate his lack
of knowledge of the contents of the pleading or that he was laboring under
a mistake of fact.
A final distinction may be drawn between pleadings utilized in pro-
ceedings the outcome of which was favorable to the pleader on the merits
and those utilized in proceedings the outcome of which was unfavorable.
When the ultimate outcome of litigation is favorable to the pleader on the
merits, it is fair to assume that fact issues raised by the pleadings have been
resolved in his favor. This in turn gives rise to an inference that state-
ments made in the pleading are reliable, which should be reflected in a more
liberal attitude on the part of the court with regards to their admission.
The pleader, however, ought to be able to challenge admission on the ground
that the issue to which the statements offered is relevant was not litigated
in the prior proceeding and was not essential to the judgment.
4. Summary
Admission of pleadings in evidence on a theory of reliability must be
differentiated from admission on an adversary theory. Reliability is the
product of veracity and objective accuracy. In the case of pleadings in
which the veracity factor is high, the pleading should be admitted unless
the pleader against whom it is offered can challenge its veracity, either on
the grounds of lack of knowledge of the contents of the pleading or mistake
of fact. If the veracity factor is low, the pleading should not be admitted
unless the party offering it can overcome the apparent lack of veracity
by demonstrating that the litigant had knowledge of the statements which
the pleading contained. Illustrations of situations in which the veracity
factor is high include pleadings signed by the party or accompanied by
his affidavit and pleadings offered in the same proceeding for which they
were drawn. In the case of pleadings signed only by an attorney or
39. Ibid.
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pleadings which are amended or withdrawn, the veracity factor is lower.
Similarly, where the pleadings are offered in a subsequent proceeding,
except perhaps, where the pleader was successful in the prior proceeding
on the merits, the veracity factor is low.
III. PLEADINGS AS EVIDENCE UNDER THE FEDEAL RULES
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to supplant earlier
rules of procedure which were deemed to hinder the enforcement of sub-
stantive justice °40 The purpose of pleading was changed from that of stat-
ing all the facts which constitute- a cause of action or defense to one of
notice, stating a claim upon which relief can be granted.41 In general,
pleadings now need only sketch the broad outlines of transactions in ques-
tion. There is no penalty attached to pleading conclusions of law or evi-
dentiary facts.4
The practice in federal courts prior to the adoption of the federal rules
was to admit in evidence pleadings which were signed by the party litigant43
Pleadings signed only by the litigant's attorney were inadmissible." The
fact that a pleading was amended 45 or withdrawn 46 did not affect its admis-
sibility as evidence if it was signed by the pleader. Just as in state courts,
admissions made in the pleading of one defendant were inadmissible in a
subsequent suit against his co-defendant.4 7
In cases decided since the effective date of the rules, no effort has
been made to decide whether the policy of the rules necessitates a change
in the existing law regarding the admission of pleadings in evidence.
48
Instead, federal courts have split widely over the problem. Some admit only
those pleadings signed by the party to be charged with the admission.42
Others admit pleadings signed by an attorney alone.50 The conflict extends
into the area of superseded pleadings as well.6
40. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rides, 15 TENN. L.
RF. 551 (1939).
41. FrD. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
42. Stayton, The Scope and Function of Pleading Under the New Federal and
Texas Rides: A Comparison, 20 TEXAs L. REv. 16, 23-24 (1941).
43. E.g., White v. Mechanics' Securities Corp., 269 U.S. 283, 301-02 (1925) ; Pope
v. Allis, 115 U.S. 363, 370-71 (1885) ; Williams v. Williams, 61 F.2d 257, 262 (7th Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 612 (1933).
44. E.g., Delaware County v. Diebold Safe Co., 133 U.S. 473, 487 (1890) ; Combs
v. Hodge, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 397, 404 (1859) ; Oregon & C.R. Co. v. Grubissich, 206
Fed. 577, 580-81 (9th Cir. 1913).
45. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir.
1929).
46. See Lyster v. Stickney, 12 Fed. 609, 610 (D. Colo. 1882).
47. Hyman v. Wheeler, 29 Fed. 347, 356-57 (D. Colo. 1886).
48. Giannone v. United States Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1956).
49. E.g., Rogers v. Edward L. Burton & Co., 137 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Hardy
v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 1942). This despite the fact that the fed-
eral rules do not require the pleadings to be signed by the party; see FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
50. E.g., Christensen v. Trotter, 171 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir. 1948) ; Jones v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 18 F.R.D. 181, 182 (M.D. Pa. 1955).
51. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Porter, 186 F.2d 834,841 (9th Cir. 1950),
where the court held a pleading signed only by the attorney admissible. Contra, Louis-
ville & N.R. Co. v. Tucker, 211 F.2d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 1954).
ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS AS EVIDENCE
A. Considerations Affecting the Admissibility of Pleadings Under
the Federal Rules
Factors affecting reliability discussed in conjunction with the use of
pleadings as evidence in code jurisdictions are also applicable to federal
practice. However, certain of the federal rules introduce new considera-
tions which must be analyzed.
Rule 8(a) requires that a party state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.52  Examples annexed to the rules make clear that considerably
less detail is required than in code jurisdictions.m Emphasis is on the
giving of notice, supplementary discovery procedures being available for
exploration of fact.54 Rule 15 complements rule 8(a) by establishing
a liberal amendment procedure.5 5 Rules 8(a) and 15 together relieve the
attorney from the compulsion of pleading with a view to laying a detailed
foundation for the later introduction of evidence. He can be more selective
in the statements included in the pleading and need phrase them only in
general terms, thereby minimizing the possibility of use of pleadings as
evidence against his client. The result should be greater veracity and
enhanced reliability of the statements made.
This general conclusion must be tempered in light of rules 8(e) (2)
and 11. Rule 8(e) (2) authorizes a party to "state as many separate claims
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency. . . ." 6 Its purpose is to
enable the party who is unsure of the facts of his case to invoke the judicial
process nevertheless. Liberal admission of pleadings in evidence might
discourage resort to this device on the one hand, and inconsistency in the
pleadings is at least prima facie evidence of unreliability on the other.
If rule 8(e) (2) is to be effectuated, statements in a pleading which is in-
consistent should be immunized until the pleader eliminates the incon-
sistency by amendment.5 7 That portion of the pleading which remains
should then be subjected to the tests of admissibility previously suggested.
Rule 11 encourages parties to plead not only what they know to be true
but also any fact which they believe "there is good ground to support." 58
An individual is permitted to state facts which he believes he can to some
extent support without believing that those facts are true. The rule
reflects the policy of limiting the pleadings to notice and emphasizing dis-
52. Fia. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
53. Id. appendix of forms.
54. Id. 26-37. Under rule 36, an opponent may compel the pleader to admit rele-
vant material, but an admission obtained in this manner may be used for the pending
action only and not in any other proceeding. Id. 36 (b).
55. "A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time be-
fore a responsive pleading is served. . . . Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
56. Fmi. R. Civ. P. 8 (e) (2).
57. E.g., Houston East & West Texas Ry. v. DeWalt, 96 Texas 121, 134, 70 S.W.
531, 537-38 (1902). But see Johnson v. Butte & Superior Copper Co., 41 Mont. 158,
166, 108 Pac. 1057, 1059 (1910). See discussion in 1 ELLow, EvmmNCm § 236 (1904).
58. Fi:. R. Civ. P. 11.
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covery and other pre-trial procedures. If pleaders accept the invitation of
rule 11, the veracity factor and therefore the reliability of all federal plead-
ings is diminished.
B. Conclusion With Respect to the Federal Rules
The veracity and hence the reliability of pleadings under the federal
rules, as compared to those under the codes, is increased by the application
of rules 8(a) and 15. The liberal amendment procedure eliminates the
hazard that unreliable statements will be made in an attempt to lay a
foundation for the later introduction of evidence. However, the applica-
tion by pleaders of rule 11 completely offsets any increased reliability
gained through rules 8(a) and 15. A signature on a pleading by a party
or an attorney is merely an affirmation that "to the best of his knowledge
there is good ground to support" the statements made.5 9 This attempt by
the framers of the federal rules to prevent sham pleadings nevertheless
leaves the door open for the inclusion of statements, the truthfulness of
which the pleader is uncertain. This factor coupled with the self-serving
nature of a pleading when it is drawn, dictates the need to prevent the
introduction in evidence of pleadings submitted under the federal rules.
The above conclusion should be modified to the extent that portions of
pleadings which are amended to conform to the proof in accordance with
rule 15(b) should be admitted. Statements of facts ascertained through
the introduction of evidence in a prior proceeding should be admitted since
they are facts gathered in court under the protection of cross-examination.
IV. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO TE CODES AND THE
FEDERAL RULES
It is extremely difficult to lay down a set of general rules which should
govern the area of pleadings as evidentiary admissions. The circumstances
surrounding every case differ: the types of parties differ; the types of facts
included in the admission are different; the impact upon the jury of some
admissions may outweigh their probative value; the attempt may be to
introduce the pleading in evidence in the same case or in a subsequent
proceeding; or in a different jurisdiction; or the pleading in question may
be one that has previously been withdrawn; or amended; or abandoned.
Although it is desirable to admit as much relevant evidence as possible
it is important to prevent the introduction of evidence when the degree
of reliability is small and the impact upon a jury may be out of proportion
to the probative value of the evidence. The introduction of a pleading in
evidence probably creates a greater impression in the minds of the jury
than does the introduction of ordinary oral testimony. An opposing at-
torney skilfully reading each word before the jury and impressing upon
them the sanctity to be accorded these legal documents, can cause an impact
which the pleader would never overcome. It is for this reason that it is
59. Ibid.
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imperative that knowledge of the pleader, and therefore the reliability factor
of veracity, be established before such evidence is admitted.
The above discussion of the reliability factor of veracity is premised
upon the knowledge of the pleader. It is therefore important that a certain
degree of flexibility be given to the rules formulated when determining
whether the litigant had knowledge of the contents of the pleading. It
should be the function of the court to determine when the above rules should
be invoked to ascertain knowledge or when rules should be completely set
aside and absolute discretion should be used.
It has been suggested that the signature of the litigant is an indication
that he was aware of the contents of the pleading. The signature of a bank
president on a legal document should, however, be considered in a different
light from the signature of an immigrant who has difficulty understanding
the English language. The court should attempt to determine whether
the litigant had an understanding of the factual content of the pleading
before admitting it in evidence. The same considerations should be applied
when only the attorney's signature appears on the pleading.
In many instances it will be apparent to the court that the information
contained in the pleading could only have been gotten from the litigant.
If a jurisdiction lists several grounds for divorce, among which is drunken-
ness, and the pleading alleges that the husband was a confirmed alcoholic,
it is a good indication that such information was gotten from the wife of
the alcoholic. However, if drunkenness is the only ground for divorce
in the particular jurisdiction, there may be some doubt as to the truthfulness
of the contents of the pleading.
There is also a need for flexibility in the area of placing the burden
of proof. Although the rules submitted in this regard appear desirable, the
court should have discretion in placing the burden of showing knowledge
in cases where one party has a decided advantage in gaining access to the
information in question. Considerations such as whether the jurisdiction
has a pre-trial discovery procedure making it easy for both parties to obtain
access to needed information, or whether the passage of time since the
filing of the pleading makes it extremely difficult for one party to deter-
mine the facts in question should influence the court's decision.
M.D.G.
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